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The European Commission’s Joint Research Centre (JRC) in collaboration 
with the Global Initiative to Combat Nuclear Terrorism (GICNT) organised 
a two and a half-day workshop on expert support and reachback entitled 
Magic Maggiore at the JRC Ispra, Italy in 28-30 March 2017. 
 
Through a series of presentations, case studies, panel discussions, and a 
demonstration exercise, Magic Maggiore helped raise awareness and build 
commitment towards technical reachback. Furthermore, the workshop 
presented best practices to address key challenges, and identified areas 
for future work in this field. The workshop included a real-time detection 
and reachback exercise of a hypothetical nuclear security incident, put on 
between the JRC (Ispra) and France (Paris). The demonstration focused 
on core components of alarm adjudication and information exchange 
between front-line officers, a national reachback centre, and an advanced 
centralised reachback centre located in Paris. 
 
A list of concrete post-workshop activities has been generated. The 
purpose of the list is to pave the way for the identification of the next 
steps towards development of European capabilities for nuclear security 
and in more general, for CBRNE security. 
 
Reachback is necessary for alarm adjudication to provide timely 
information for a balanced response. Information sharing between 
competent authorities is of vital importance for nuclear security. Due to 
the variety of responsibilities, Technical, Scientific and Operational support 
needs to be defined. The Member States should consider developing joint 
protocols on data structures and data handling to ease the information 
flow and so the response time. 
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1 Scope and structure of the workshop 
 
The European Commission’s Joint Research Centre (JRC) in collaboration 
with the Global Initiative to Combat Nuclear Terrorism (GICNT) organised 
a two and a half-day workshop on expert support and reachback entitled 
Magic Maggiore at the JRC Ispra, Italy from 28-30 March 2017. The 
workshop brought together more than 60 experts from 25 countries, and 
representatives from the European Commission (EC) and the International 
Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA). Most of the participants were technical, 
scientific, or operational experts on detection of and response to a nuclear 
security event, including information sharing, data processing, alarm 
adjudication and technical responsibilities, such as running and sustaining 
large detection networks for nuclear security. 
 
The workshop included a series of presentations and panel discussions to 
introduce the key themes for the discussion with a particular focus on the 
roles and responsibilities of expert support. A deep dive was made into 
three common reachback challenges: information sharing, alarm 
adjudication, and detection technology. Also, the impact of the new 
technology on nuclear security detection architectures was analysed. 
 
National-level presentations were included to identify the core 
components of different reachback systems. Supporting panel discussions 
were focused on scaling and sustaining reachback capabilities. 
 
A real-time detection demonstration was organised between the JRC and 
France to show how the front-line officers (FLO) and the reachback centre 
could work together to resolve a complex nuclear security event. 
2 Main findings 
 
During the workshop, it transpired that the participants use words or 
concepts that have very different meanings in different countries or even 
in different authorities within a country. It was acknowledged that the 
lexicon issue needs further clarification. Otherwise, the development of 
guidelines and recommendations is made difficult. For example, in some 
contexts ‘expert support’ is a synonym to reachback. However, many 
experts view these two as separate concepts: 
  
 Reachback is a (virtual) network of subject matter experts to 
provide advisory, technical, and coordination assistance. 
 
 Expert support is an operational or technical capability that can be 
deployed to the field to resolve a potential or actual nuclear security 
event. 
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Additionally, the concept ‘triage’ can refer to the analysis services of a 
reachback centre to find out the unusual observations (alarms) from a 
massive amount of data. 
 
Due to a variety of roles and responsibilities of technical experts, 
participants proposed that there are three levels of expert support: 
 
1. Technical support, which includes detection systems, deployment 
and maintenance of equipment and training of operational forces. 
 
2. Scientific support, which assesses, offers in-depth analysis, and 
adjudicates alarms on request from the FLO. 
 
3. Operational support, which integrates with operative units, such as 
CBRNE teams, law enforcement investigators, and crime scene 
management. 
 
Challenges facing expert support include distribution and processing of 
information, understanding the operating environment (remotely), as well 
as information security and accuracy. Reachback support during an 
incident requires timely response and exchange of information between 
FLO, technical and scientific experts, Command and Control (CC) and 
decision-makers. Therefore, the experts need to understand what 
information is relevant to FLO and CC in order to appropriately and 
effectively respond to a situation. And vice versa, FLO and CC need to 
understand the role of the experts in the operational cooperation. 
 
The participants identified the following ‘best practices’: 
 
 Include expert support in the national-level information sharing 
protocols, as well as in the emergency response coordination 
mechanisms. 
 
 Conduct joint exercises (including table top exercises and drills) 
that test and evaluate the interactions between technical experts, 
law enforcement, and decision-makers. 
 
 Conduct peer-to-peer exchange, joint training, and exercises with 
regional partners and international organisations to enhance the 
information sharing procedures and advance relationships between 
partner-nations. 
 
 Identify and make use of advanced regional or international 
partners for reachback services to support national efforts in 
developing analysis capabilities for alarm adjudication. 
 
European Reference Network for Critical Infrastructure Protection 









In border control, the main operational challenge is to reach the right 
balance between addressing threats and clearance efficiency. This balance 
depends on the speed and accuracy of adjudicating innocent and false 
alarms in order to effectively respond to threats while maintaining the 
necessary flow of people and commerce. FLOs must know when and how 
to request technical or scientific expert support and there has to be 
established procedures to facilitate a quick transmission of threat and/or 
alarm information. 
 
Decision-makers, CC, FLOs and experts can share technical data in a 
variety of ways, including formally established communication tools 
(methods such as the use of encryption, secure cloud services or 
dedicated mobile networks) or informal methods. Regardless, protocols 
for both on-scene operators and remote technical experts should clearly 
define the procedures for sharing the technical data. Additionally, 
information exchange applies to many other aspects of expert support, 
such as deploying instruments and improving cooperation over borders as 
well as national, regional, bilateral, or international exchange of 
information on prevailing threats. 
 
Detection technology faces a multitude of challenges: efficiency of 
detection depends on type of detector, speed, distance, time, and 
background levels; the frequency of false alarms and innocent alarms; 
and masking or shielding tactics. No single detector technology addresses 
all detection needs. Thus, when developing, implementing, and improving 
plans, processes, and capabilities, nations should consider the 
characteristics of different instrumentations and technical expertise to 
better understand the advantages and constraints of the detection 
technology. Nations can then consider relevant trade-offs to develop and 
modify protocols and guidance, in order to properly deploy the detection 
resources. 
 
A major public event may be at higher risk of being the target of a nuclear 
security incident. Technical support teams may therefore be on-site being 
capable of operating in a degraded environment with degraded 
communication capabilities. On the other hand, these forces may also 
utilise remote reachback support that requires enhanced coordination 
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3 Workshop conclusions — key takeaways 
 
A nation’s threat and risk assessment should include the development and 
deployment of technical, scientific, and operational reachback support. 
 
Bilateral or regional protocols and memorandums of understanding 
(MOUs) for alarm adjudication and reachback support would improve the 
efficiency of nuclear security detection architectures of the states 
involved. 
 
Use of detection instruments should be supported by technical and 
scientific experts. 
 
A number of participants noted that there may be a need to define 
precisely the key concepts of information sharing and cooperation 
between the competent authorities. In particular, the concepts reachback, 
expert support, and triage are used with different meanings in different 
countries or even within the competent authorities of a country. A joint 
lexicon, acknowledged internationally, is warranted. 
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4 After-action analysis by the ERNCIP Thematic Group 
Radiological and Nuclear Threats to Critical 
Infrastructure — Reachback sub-group 
 
A sub-group meeting of the ERNCIP Radiological and Nuclear Threats to 
Critical Infrastructure Thematic Group was held on 14-15 September 2017 
in London. Among other things, this meeting continued the discussion on 
Magic Maggiore outcomes. As a result, a preliminary list of concrete 
activities was generated for further consideration and discussion at the 
ERNCIP RN Thematic Group’s reachback meeting in Brussels on 11 
October 2017. The purpose of the list is to pave the way for the 
identification of the next steps towards development of European 
capabilities for nuclear security and in more general, for CBRNE security. 
Some of these activities are for adoption by the ERNCIP RN Thematic 
Group, while some actions are recommended for other relevant bodies. 
4.1 Awareness raising 
 
1. Awareness raising on expert support 
Organise awareness events for decision-makers on the role of 
expert support. Promote enhanced collaboration between FLOs, 
technical and scientific experts, and international partners. 
Influence the agenda of upcoming workshops by suggesting 
workshop topics. 
 
2. Cross-border demonstrations and exercises 
Organise cross-border demonstrations and exercises with 
reachback involvement nationally and bilaterally. Invite EC/JRC 
observers and document the exercises in collaboration with the 
organisers and disseminate the results to a broader audience. 
 
3. Dissemination of activities 
Co-organise joint JRC/GICNT events inviting international 
organisations such as the IAEA and Interpol in a role suiting the 
development of their nuclear security efforts. 
 
 
4. Different detection systems 
Arrange awareness-raising campaigns targeted for decision-makers 
on the use of different sets of detection instruments combined with 
strong expert support. Different technologic choices go from low 
cost, low-performance technologies to high-cost, high-performance 
technologies. The philosophy of a nuclear security detection 
architecture is based on the different sets of detection instruments 
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combined with expert support services which in turn depend on the 
type of data to be analysed. 
 
4.2 Scientific, technical and operational expert support 
 
5. Novel detection technology 
Analyse the impact of the integration of novel technologies, such as 
the use of list-mode data format, on detection, identification, 
localisation, source characterisation and radiological threat and risk 
assessment. What does this mean for reachback services, including 
common centralised database structures? What kind of access 
experts and different competent authorities should have to the data 
and results? What kind of software should be developed for data 
management? 
 
6. Core capabilities of expert support 
Explore and identify the core capabilities of expert support. Define 
notional models for expert support containing different levels of 
technology and expertise. Utilise technical and scientific experts to 
improve the detection technology for usability, interoperability, 
efficiency, sustainability, accuracy and reliability. Notice that there 
are different detection architectures that require different kinds of 
expert support. 
 
7. Cost–benefit analysis 
Perform cost–benefit analysis on expert support considering 
different sets of technologies for primary and secondary inspection. 
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4.3 Alarm adjudication 
 
8. Procedures for alarm adjudication 
Identify the procedures for timely, correct and efficient alarm 
adjudication. Expert support helps prevent overreaction when there 
is no threat, while enabling appropriate response when the threat 
appears to be real. In border control, the main operational 
challenge is to reach the right balance between addressing threats 
and clearance efficiency. This balance depends on the speed and 
accuracy of adjudicating innocent and false alarms in order to 
effectively respond to threats while maintaining the necessary flow 
of people and commerce. 
 
9. Best practices for FLO 
Identify and promote best practices to help FLOs to adjudicate 
alarms. FLOs must know when and how to request technical or 
scientific expert support and there has to be established procedures 
to facilitate a quick transmission of threat and/or alarm information. 
 
4.4 CBRNE threat management — integrated prevention, detection 
and response 
 
10. Status of CBRNE strategies 
Review the status of CBRNE strategies in EU Member States. Some 
EU Member States may have integrated CBRNE strategies instead 
of dedicated C, B, RN and E strategies. Furthermore, find out which 
EU Member States have developed nuclear security detection 
architectures. Reachback is usually a cross-cutting element of such 
an architecture. 
 
11.Action plan on CBRNE security risks 
Support the implementation of the new EC action plan on CBRNE 
security risks (October 18, 2017 — COM(2017) 610 final). 
Especially the following objects support the development of nuclear 
security architectures: 
 Strengthen risk-based customs controls to intercept dangerous 
CBRN materials at the border (1.2); 
 Conduct a gap analysis on the detection of CBRN materials 
(2.3); 
 Reinforce nuclear security capacities and networks (2.9); 
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12.Active interrogation to detect CBRNE threat 
Adopt active interrogation techniques for non-destructive detection 
of shielded nuclear materials, chemical weapons, explosives, etc. 
The produced data can be analysed automatically but expert review 
and interpretation as well as timely information sharing may still be 
needed. Reachback capability allows the separation of the analyst 
and the instruments. Both fixed and relocatable active interrogation 
systems are commercially available. Passive radiation 
measurements produce rather similar data compared to active 
interrogation. Reachback related to passive measurements is 
already operationally used in some EU Member States. Investigate 
the role of reachback in case of active interrogation. 
 
13.Role of subject matter experts 
Determine pros and cons related to independent and integrated 
CBRNE reachback solutions. Independent of the characteristics of 
the threat, the same FLOs are the responding officers. For different 
threats, there are often different supporting expert organisations. 
Analyse the need for remote expert support in the C, B and E fields, 
noting that part of the metadata is the same for all: time, 
geolocation (GPS), communication tools, event information, etc. 
Note that in real life there can also be multi-threat situations. 
Protection of CBRNE detection and response teams is of utmost 
importance (safety as first principle). Consider here also the 
development of joint CBRNE data structures. 
 
 
14.Role of ERNCIP 
Assess the role of ERNCIP in promoting nuclear security. ERNCIP is 
a good forum to initiate non-binding cross disciplinary discussions 
related to CBRNE reachback since it has thematic groups for most 
of the threats. Cross-thematic group meetings could be useful to 
get together relevant expertise. ERNCIP could also review outcomes 
of relevant FP7 and Horizon 2020 projects such as GIFT and 
C-BORD. These projects produce technology for more than one of 
the CBRNE threats. Efficient detection and handling of CBRNE 
situations is also in the interest of special military units. Therefore, 
civilian CBRNE reachback solutions might also interest them. 
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4.5 International issues 
 
15. International agreements 
Analyse whether reachback and/or cross-border nuclear security 
cooperation and information sharing are adequately addressed in 
international agreements and/or in binding EU documentation such 
as the BSS (basic safety standard) directive. Review also the IAEA 
documentation in this respect. Document the findings and potential 
gaps. 
 
16. International assistance 
Identify areas where international assistance can support national 
capabilities regarding expert support and reachback. Identify where 
and how advanced regional or international reachback support 
could complement national capabilities. 
 
17. Bilateral or regional protocols 
Promote bilateral or regional protocols and memorandums of 
understanding (MOU) for alarm adjudication and reachback 




Promote harmonised understanding of Expert Support, Reachback 
and Triage through lexicons at EC and other international level. 
 
19. Nuclear Security Detection Architecture 
Draft an EU guideline on Nuclear Security Detection Architecture 
and related expert support. Extract and use elements from the 
recommendations of the IAEA Nuclear Security Series (NSS). The 
objective is to develop minimum specifications for the design and 
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